Why Africa must chart its own course on climate and development
By Staff Writer
Nearly a year into Donald Trump’s second presidency, the direction of US energy policy is clear. “Drill, baby, drill,” the president repeated at rallies in early 2025, as his administration expanded federal oil and gas leasing and rolled back methane regulations introduced under the previous government. The signal has extended beyond Washington. It has shaped investor behaviour, softened corporate climate commitments and weakened political resolve across much of the developed world.
For African policymakers, this shift raises a practical question. Should the continent align its development strategy with Western net-zero ambitions that are increasingly vulnerable to political reversal, or pursue a path centred on energy security, industrial growth and climate resilience regardless of changing priorities in rich economies?
The stakes are unequal. Africa contributes less than 4 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, according to the Global Carbon Project, yet it is among the regions most exposed to climate disruption. Prolonged droughts in the Horn of Africa, repeated floods in Kenya and Tanzania, and rising food insecurity across the Sahel have made climate risk an immediate economic issue. As Western governments and corporations step back from climate commitments, Africa faces a strategic choice that will shape its growth trajectory for decades.
A retreat that is no longer isolated
What once appeared to be episodic political turbulence in the West now looks structural.
In Britain, the first major economy to legislate net zero in 2019, political consensus has fractured. Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch abandoned the party’s commitment to net zero by 2050 in 2025, arguing that the policy imposed excessive costs on households and businesses. Labour has also faced pressure to soften its climate stance. Former prime minister Tony Blair warned publicly that voters were being asked to bear financial sacrifices with limited impact on global emissions.
At the local level, councils controlled by Reform UK have rescinded climate emergency declarations and opposed renewable energy developments, particularly onshore wind.
The corporate response has followed a similar pattern. Net Zero Tracker reports that more than one third of major global companies diluted, delayed or quietly dropped climate targets between 2023 and 2024. Climate ambition, once treated as a reputational asset, has become politically and commercially contested.
The automotive sector illustrates the shift. After pledging rapid electrification following the pandemic, several manufacturers have reversed course. Ford recorded a $19.5 billion write-down, roughly KSh 2.5 trillion, on its electric vehicle division in 2024 and cancelled planned models, citing weaker-than-expected demand. Volkswagen and General Motors have also extended timelines for full electrification.
Chris Heron, secretary general of E-Mobility Europe, warned in a 2024 industry briefing that Europe’s hesitation risked long-term competitiveness. While China accelerates, he said, Europe hesitates.
China’s contrasting trajectory
China offers a contrasting trajectory. In 2024, it installed more solar capacity in a single year than the entire world did in 2019, according to the International Energy Agency. Clean energy accounted for more than half of new power generation capacity, and renewable electricity overtook coal-fired generation during several months of the year.
This expansion reflects industrial policy rather than environmental idealism. China dominates global manufacturing of solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles, exporting clean energy technologies worth more than $100 billion annually, about KSh 13 trillion. The sector now supports millions of jobs and underpins export growth.
For African economies, the implication is practical. Decarbonisation can support industrial development and competitiveness rather than constrain them.
Africa’s different starting point
Africa does not face the same transition costs as industrialised economies. Much of its energy, transport and industrial infrastructure has yet to be built. This reduces the risk of high-emissions lock-in.
Kenya illustrates the opportunity. The country generates roughly 90 percent of its electricity from renewable sources, mainly geothermal, hydro and wind, according to the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority. This places Kenya ahead of most OECD economies and provides a foundation for low-carbon industrial expansion.
Yet vulnerabilities persist. Transport systems across East Africa remain heavily dependent on imported petroleum products, exposing economies to volatile global oil prices and straining foreign exchange reserves.
Globally, clean energy investment reached $2 trillion, about KSh 260 trillion, in 2024, double the amount flowing into fossil fuels, according to the IEA. Africa received less than 3 percent of this capital, underscoring the disconnect between global investment trends and regional needs.
Aviation highlights the challenge. Airbus has delayed hydrogen-powered aircraft until at least 2035, while sustainable aviation fuel accounts for less than 1 percent of global jet fuel supply, according to the International Air Transport Association. For tourism-dependent economies such as Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda, this raises the risk of future carbon-related levies or border measures imposed by wealthier markets.
Finance retreats when Africa needs it most
The pullback extends into financial services. In October 2024, the Net-Zero Banking Alliance effectively unravelled after major institutions including JP Morgan, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Barclays and HSBC withdrew following political pressure in the United States.
For Africa, the implications are significant. The African Development Bank estimates the continent requires around $250 billion annually, roughly KSh 32.5 trillion, to meet climate mitigation and adaptation needs. Current flows fall well short.
HSBC’s decision to delay key climate targets by up to 20 years and weaken the link between executive pay and emissions reduction illustrates how quickly priorities can change. Similar signals have come from the energy sector. Before his departure, BP’s former chief executive Murray Auchincloss acknowledged that the company’s earlier optimism about the pace of the energy transition had been misplaced. Shell has since announced plans to increase oil and gas production while cutting investment in renewables.
For African oil producers such as Nigeria and Angola, and emerging ones like Uganda and Kenya, the trade-off is clear. Near-term revenues compete with the risk of infrastructure that may lose value as global energy systems evolve.
Supply chains will transmit pressure regardless
Even as Western firms soften public commitments, climate pressure is shifting into supply chains.
The British Retail Consortium reports that only 38 percent of major suppliers have credible net-zero targets, with agriculture and logistics lagging most. At the same time, European regulations increasingly require emissions disclosure across value chains.
For African exporters of tea, coffee, flowers and horticultural products, this creates both risk and opportunity. Kenya supplies roughly 38 percent of cut flowers sold in Europe. Larger producers have adopted sustainability certifications, but most smallholders lack the capital and technical capacity to meet new reporting requirements without support.
Those able to adapt may secure preferential access and stronger market positions. Those who do not risk exclusion, regardless of political backsliding in Western capitals.
COP30 and the limits of Western leadership
The outcome of COP30 in Belém, Brazil reinforced these dynamics. While the summit reaffirmed global temperature goals, it exposed the persistent gap between ambition and delivery in developed economies. Commitments on climate finance, adaptation and loss and damage remained largely non-binding, with limited clarity on scale or timelines.
African and Latin American blocs pressed for predictable and concessional finance, but the final agreements fell short of the levels identified by institutions such as the African Development Bank. COP30 underscored the extent to which climate leadership in advanced economies is constrained by domestic political pressures.
The summit also highlighted growing momentum for South–South cooperation. Brazil, China and India emphasised industrial policy, domestic manufacturing and energy security alongside emissions reduction. This approach aligns more closely with African development priorities than models dependent on Western finance alone.
A moment that demands clarity
The weakening of climate commitments in the West should not be interpreted in Africa as a reason for delay. It reflects political recalibration in advanced economies rather than a reduction in climate risk.
For African economies, climate impacts are already affecting agricultural output, water availability and urban infrastructure. At the same time, energy and transport systems remain under development, leaving scope to avoid high-cost pathways that have proven difficult to reverse elsewhere.
Clean energy investment should therefore be assessed in practical terms. Renewable power reduces exposure to fuel imports. Electric public transport lowers operating costs in cities. Local manufacturing of energy technologies can support employment and industrial capability. These considerations are economic rather than ideological.
As Western governments reassess their ambitions and corporations recalibrate commitments, African policymakers face a narrower but clearer set of choices. Strategies that delay transition risk locking in infrastructure that may become costly or obsolete. Approaches that prioritise flexibility, regional integration and cost-effective technologies offer more durable outcomes.
The direction Africa takes will be shaped less by Western retreat than by domestic policy decisions, regional coordination and the alignment of investment with long-term economic resilience.
