Kenya should regulate its minibuses, not strangle them
By Analysis Desk
Kenya’s urban transport landscape presents a management paradox: the very system that moves more than 70% of commuters operates largely outside formal planning frameworks. Matatus (the privately owned minibuses that transport approximately one million passengers daily in Nairobi alone) have evolved from an improvised solution into an economic necessity, yet they remain marginalised in official transport blueprints.
The gap between reality and policy has narrowed in recent years, driven by data collection projects and mounting pressure on overstretched infrastructure. As Nairobi and other Kenyan cities develop bus rapid transit networks and smart mobility frameworks, the question is no longer whether matatus belong in the plan, but how to integrate them without dismantling a system that millions depend upon.
The scale and economics of informal transit
Matatus emerged in the 1960s to fill gaps left by inadequate formal transport provision. President Jomo Kenyatta’s 1973 decree legalised operations for vehicles under three tonnes, removing licensing requirements in what was characterised as a populist acknowledgement of their economic contribution. The sector expanded rapidly through the 1980s and 1990s, fuelled by urbanisation and the decline of state-run services.
By 2000, approximately 40,000 matatus operated nationally. Today, more than 600 government-registered Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) organise the industry, though enforcement remains inconsistent. Research by Deloitte found that over 70% of commuters in Kenya use matatus as part of their daily commute, with walking and matatu travel accounting for 89% of all adult commuting in urban Kenya.
The economic footprint extends beyond passenger transport. The sector employs more than 100,000 people as drivers, conductors and associated workers, whilst generating substantial revenues for vehicle owners and SACCOs. A 2018 report for the Deloitte study estimated that 450,000 people in Metro Manila depend directly on the Philippine jeepney sector for their livelihoods (a figure that offers context for Kenya’s similarly informal transport economy).
Yet the system operates with significant friction. Matatu operators pay regular bribes to police officers to avoid vehicle impoundment and penalties, according to multiple studies. Corruption is exacerbated by what one academic termed “punitive laws” that create opportunities for extractive enforcement. A 2023 analysis by the Matatu Association noted that proposed cashless payment systems and strict operating procedures risked opening “more room for bribery and extortion.”
Competition over routes has historically turned violent. In the 1990s and early 2000s, informal groups battled for control of lucrative corridors. The introduction of mandatory SACCO membership aimed to reduce this instability, though cartel activity persists at major termini, where vehicle owners report paying up to KES 6.5 million (USD 50,000) to access certain routes, plus daily fees of KES 65,000 (USD 500).
Regulatory attempts and their limits
Regulatory interventions have followed a pattern of announcement, initial compliance and gradual erosion. The most notable attempt came in 2004 with Legal Notice No. 161, commonly known as the “Michuki Rules” after the then-Transport Minister John Michuki. The regulations mandated seat belts, speed governors and a ban on standing passengers. Thousands of vehicles were temporarily pulled from the road, forcing many commuters to walk to work.
The Michuki Rules produced measurable safety improvements in the short term, reducing accident fatalities. However, lax enforcement in subsequent years saw violations return. A similar cycle followed the 2010 government policy to phase out minibus matatus in Nairobi in favour of larger buses seating 25 or more. The policy stalled; existing vehicles continued operating, and no new enforcement mechanism materialised.
More recent initiatives have fared no better. A 2014 push for cashless transactions aimed to enable taxation and regulate fluctuating fares, but failed amid what analysts described as “complicated power structures.” In May 2025, the Nairobi County government unveiled new regulations requiring matatus to adopt cashless fare systems whilst following stricter operating procedures within the Central Business District. Wilfred Bosire, Secretary General of the Matatu Association, characterised the proposals as “ill-intended,” arguing they ignored operational realities.
The regulatory challenge is compounded by data gaps. As one 2016 academic study noted, “there is no consistent data available regarding matatus. Either there is no central database or there is extremely limited access to the database that tracks the various characteristics of matatus operating in Nairobi.”
Digital mapping: making the invisible visible
The Digital Matatus project, launched in 2012 through collaboration between the University of Nairobi, MIT, Columbia University and the design firm Groupshot, addressed this information deficit. Student teams rode more than 130 routes with GPS-enabled smartphones, recording stops and route paths using apps including MyTracks and TransitWand.
The resulting dataset was formatted into General Transit Feed Specification (GTFS) (a standard normally used for scheduled transit systems) adapted to accommodate the matatu system’s flexible stops and variable service frequencies. The project released a comprehensive transit map in January 2014, the first official visualisation of Nairobi’s informal transport network.
The map was incorporated into Google Maps in August 2015, enabling smartphone users to plan trips via matatu for the first time. According to a survey conducted by the project team, 86% of respondents believed the map made it easier to use public transit in Nairobi, whilst 83% reported they would try alternative matatu routes based on the information.
Sarah Williams, assistant professor at MIT’s Department of Urban Studies and Planning, who led the project, emphasised the planning implications: “Roughly 3.5 million people depend on matatus every day in Nairobi but have little information on the more than 130 different routes.” The data has since been used by UN-Habitat to guide Bus Rapid Transit planning and by the World Bank in project work for Nairobi.
Local technology companies developed five mobile routing applications using the open-source data, including Ma3Route and Transit App. The project demonstrated that informal systems, despite their perceived chaos, follow discoverable patterns that can be documented and leveraged for planning.
GPS tracking and operational transparency
Beyond route mapping, technology initiatives have targeted the opacity of matatu operations. A collaboration between the University of Nairobi and the University of California, Berkeley, developed monitoring devices considerably cheaper than traditional GPS trackers. The system, branded SmartMatatu, allows vehicle owners to track driving behaviour via SMS alerts, including instances of speeding, off-route diversions and excessive idling.
The Berkeley-led research team conducted a randomised controlled trial in Nairobi’s informal transportation sector, where small and medium-sized enterprises hire drivers on a daily basis. Matatu owners received information on driver performance, enabling closer monitoring of activities that previously occurred beyond their observation. The Development Impact Lab project documentation noted that the technology aimed to enable “longer, performance-based contracts, increased productivity, and safer driving.”
A separate commercial venture, Data Integrated, has fitted matatus with GPS tracking, mobile ticketing machines and cameras that count passengers and match them to tickets sold. Mary Mwangi, co-founder and CEO of Data Integrated, explained the problem in a 2020 CNN interview: “As a bus owner, you give the bus to the driver and conductor in the morning and then in the evening you have no way of knowing what’s happening during the day.”
For owners, reliable passenger data enables them to set target fees that better reflect ticket revenue, reducing disputes and the scope for revenue diversion. The technology also addresses safety concerns by providing evidence in the event of accidents or disputes.
Commercial GPS tracking services are now widely available in Kenya. Companies including Ifuate, Keen Track and Scepture Empire offer matatu fleet management systems for monthly fees starting at KES 19,500 (USD 150), with devices priced from KES 780,000 (USD 6,000) to KES 1.56 million (USD 12,000). These systems provide real-time location data, fuel management, geo-fencing alerts and engine disable functions for theft prevention.
Lessons from Manila’s jeepney modernisation
The Philippines offers a parallel case study in the integration of iconic informal transport. Jeepneys (colourful passenger vehicles originally fashioned from surplus U.S. military jeeps after World War II) dominate public transport in many Philippine cities. Approximately 250,000 jeepney units operate nationwide, with 55,000 plying around 900 routes in Metro Manila.
In 2017, the Philippine government launched the Public Utility Vehicle Modernisation Program (PUVMP), requiring jeepney operators to replace vehicles older than 15 years with Euro 4-compliant or electric models, consolidate into cooperatives or corporations and participate in structured route planning. The programme aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (jeepneys accounted for 15.5% of the Philippines’ 28.4 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent road transport emissions in 2015) and improve safety and service quality.
The initiative met fierce resistance. Modern jeepneys cost approximately PHP 2.8 million (KES 7.28 million or USD 56,000) per unit, compared to PHP 200,000 to PHP 600,000 (KES 520,000 to KES 1.56 million or USD 4,000 to USD 12,000) for traditional jeepneys. Although the government offered subsidies of PHP 160,000 (KES 416,000 or USD 3,200) per vehicle, operators calculated they would need to earn PHP 3,500 (KES 9,100 or USD 70) per day to repay debt, against current earnings of approximately PHP 2,000 (KES 5,200 or USD 40) per day.
Transport groups including PISTON and Manibela, representing nearly 100,000 drivers and operators, staged strikes in March 2023, arguing the programme lacked adequate financial support and threatened to push individual operators into debt. Vice President Leni Robredo noted that drivers and operators should be allowed to participate in public consultations, whilst Senator Grace Poe questioned the government’s readiness, pointing out that full implementation would require PHP 415 billion (KES 1.08 trillion or USD 8.3 billion), far exceeding the PHP 2.26 billion (KES 5.88 billion or USD 45 million) initially approved.
Early evaluation data from modernised routes showed mixed results. A 2019 study found that operations on modernised routes performed better in vehicle operating hours (19 versus 14) and employed more staff per vehicle (at least two drivers versus one), with staff receiving employee benefits. Fuel economy improved to 156 kilometres per litre per passenger versus 111 kilometres per litre. However, daily ridership dropped from 460 to 300, and daily staff earnings remained similar at approximately EUR 10.50 to EUR 11.50 (KES 1,365 to KES 1,495 or USD 10.50 to USD 11.50).
As of mid-2021, only 300 approved routes operated nationwide under the programme. By late 2023, approximately 63.5% of public utility vehicles had reached agreement to consolidate, but only 6,814 new units had been financed out of 158,281 operational jeepneys. A 2023 academic analysis concluded that the programme, despite environmental benefits, suffered from lack of clarity and failed to provide a “fair and just transition.”
The Philippine experience highlights three critical factors for informal transport integration: the importance of affordable financing mechanisms, the need for inclusive stakeholder engagement from programme design through implementation and the risk that modernisation requirements can destabilise livelihoods faster than they improve service quality.
Integration into transit masterplans
Nairobi’s transport planning has undergone a conceptual shift from exclusion to cautious integration. The Nairobi Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (NaMATA), established to coordinate mass rapid transit development, now acknowledges matatus as a necessary component of the system rather than an obstacle to be removed.
The Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) blueprint envisions Bus Rapid Transit corridors, commuter rail networks and non-motorised transport infrastructure, with matatus providing feeder services and operating routes not served by BRT lines. Five BRT corridors have been gazetted, with Line 2 (Simba) on Thika Superhighway currently under infrastructure upgrades and Line 3 (Chui) in advanced planning stages.
The Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP) has been conducting passenger surveys to inform BRT service planning. Between 2020 and 2021, a team from Kenya’s Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing Urban Development and Public Works conducted frequency-occupancy counts, boarding and alighting surveys and transfer pattern analysis. Survey teams took more than 947 trips by matatu, recording detailed information using GPS-enabled smartphone applications.
The data enables modelling of service scenarios that integrate BRT with existing matatu operations. ITDP’s analysis suggests that instead of enforcing a Central Business District matatu ban (which would increase average transfer walking time from 15 to 31 minutes) the city should introduce cross-town routes to serve high-demand corridors. This approach would reduce the number of passengers requiring CBD transfers by at least 156,000 per day whilst decreasing matatu volumes in the central district.
Jacqueline Klopp, research scholar at Columbia University’s Center for Sustainable Urban Development and co-lead of the Digital Matatus project, argued in 2015 that development planning has historically marginalised public transport: “We can make these new cities more equitable and cleaner if we focus more on public transport.”
In January 2021, ITDP Africa recommended that Nairobi reform matatu management to improve service quality on both BRT and regular public service vehicle lines. The proposal calls for transitioning from the “target system” (where drivers pay vehicle owners a fixed daily amount and keep passenger revenues) to a model where operator compensation is tied to kilometres travelled and service quality metrics. Such reforms require transparent processes for determining affected operators and providing pathways for participation as shareholders in modern bus operating companies.
The U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation’s KES 7.8 billion (USD 60 million) Kenya Urban Mobility and Growth Threshold Program, signed in September 2023, will fund integrated transport planning, first and last mile connections, detailed land use projects and blended finance for BRT acquisition. The programme explicitly aims to address challenges facing the matatu transport system alongside establishing efficient mass bus transit.
The European Union has committed EUR 347.6 million (KES 45.4 billion or USD 349 million), including EUR 45 million (KES 5.9 billion or USD 45 million) in grants, for Nairobi Core Bus Rapid Transit Line 3, with funding conditioned on clean, electric vehicle deployment.
Commuter benefits: evidence and expectations
For passengers, integration promises several improvements. Formal route planning and dedicated BRT lanes could reduce travel times for commuters currently enduring what research describes as regularly exceeding two hours each way in Nairobi’s gridlock. A 2019 study found median commute times of just 20 minutes in smaller Kenyan cities, but longer durations in Nairobi, where a large fraction of vehicles plying roadways are matatus jockeying for passengers.
Digital routing applications enable commuters to identify faster connections and compare options. The Digital Matatus project survey found that 80% of respondents lacked access to route data before the mapping initiative, constraining their ability to optimise journeys.
Modernisation of vehicle fleets promises environmental and health benefits. Matatus, predominantly diesel vehicles, idle extensively in urban areas, contributing to air pollution. Electric vehicle adoption is progressing slowly (Kenya has approximately 2,000 registered electric vehicles), with SACCOs including Citi Hoppa and Super Metro beginning electric bus trials in 2022 using BYD K6 models leased by BasiGo.
A 2020 health impact assessment for Manila’s jeepney modernisation estimated that full adoption of Euro 4 compliant vehicles would reduce PM2.5, NOx and SOx emissions, though the study noted that increased electricity generation for charging infrastructure could partially offset air quality gains depending on power source mix.
Service reliability represents another potential gain. Joseph Ndiritu, National Chairman of the Public Transport Operators Union (PUTON) and former matatu driver, argued in a 2022 publication that “the solutions must come from the industry itself, from the inherent innovation of the matatus.” He emphasised that punitive regulatory measures show little success in driving reforms, whilst enforcement remains sparse.
Safety improvements depend on effective implementation of existing regulations. Kenya has one of the highest pedestrian fatality rates globally, with matatus implicated in numerous accidents attributed to speeding, overloading and dangerous driving. The 2004 Michuki Rules demonstrated that properly enforced standards can reduce road deaths, but sustaining compliance requires institutional capacity and political will that has historically proven elusive.
Policy roadmap: balancing integration and innovation
Successful integration of informal transport into urban masterplans requires policy frameworks that respect existing economic relationships whilst enabling service improvements. Four principles emerge from the Kenyan and Philippine experiences:
Preserve livelihoods during transition. Modernisation programmes that impose unaffordable vehicle replacement costs risk displacing thousands of workers. The Philippine case demonstrates that subsidies covering 5% to 6% of vehicle costs fail to bridge affordability gaps. Kenya should explore graduated transition timelines, enhanced financing mechanisms with manageable repayment terms and opportunities for current operators to participate as shareholders in modernised entities.
Build on existing data and technology foundations. The Digital Matatus project proved that informal systems can be documented using accessible technology. Policymakers should mandate open data standards for route information, support expansion of GPS tracking for fleet management and integrate matatu data into multimodal journey planning applications. The Digital Matatus GTFS dataset has been downloaded more than 5,000 times since 2014, demonstrating demand for standardised transit information.
Design infrastructure that serves actual demand patterns. BRT planning must reflect passenger transfer patterns revealed through detailed surveys, rather than imposing service restrictions that increase commuter burden. Cross-town routes and well-designed interchange facilities can reduce CBD congestion without banning matatus from the city centre, preserving the flexibility that makes informal transport responsive to demand fluctuations.
Institutionalise stakeholder participation. Transport planning in Kenya has often proceeded with limited operator input. The Cooperative Development Authority noted in 2017 that jeepney driver-operator groups in the Philippines were excluded from technical working groups for the modernisation programme. Kenya should establish formal consultation mechanisms that include SACCO representatives, driver and conductor unions and commuter advocacy groups in corridor planning, service design and regulatory development.
Winnie Mitullah of the University of Nairobi has documented the matatu sector’s policy turning points: the 1973 Presidential Decree, the Michuki Rules, CBD decongestion attempts, SACCO company requirements and vehicle size mandates. Each intervention aimed to bring order to what authorities perceived as chaos, yet the sector’s fundamental structure (privately owned vehicles operating on competitive routes) has persisted.
The Transport Licensing Board registered 655 SACCOs by March 2011, then stopped further registration to vet existing organisations and eliminate cartels. Board Chairman Hassan ole Kamwaro stated that some SACCOs had been registered by touts and cartels charging vehicle owners KES 6.5 million (USD 50,000) to join and KES 65,000 (USD 500) in daily fees. Regulatory frameworks must therefore address not only service quality and safety, but also the power structures that enable extractive practices.
The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics data indicate that private car and motorcycle registrations are increasing rapidly. As incomes and education levels rise, demand for motorised transport options will grow. The challenge, as one 2019 academic paper framed it, is to “maintain environmental sustainability while solving the safety, health, and commuting time problems caused by their current, relatively informal, systems.”
Whether Kenya succeeds in integrating matatus into smart city transport plans will determine the inclusivity and effectiveness of urban mobility for the next generation. The alternative (continuing to plan around informal transport rather than with it) risks creating infrastructure that serves only a privileged minority whilst the majority remain dependent on an under-supported, under-regulated system that operates despite, rather than because of, official policy.
