At a mining conference in Lubumbashi last year, a Congolese minerals trader posed a question that has haunted policymakers ever since: “Why do we export cobalt at $30,000 per tonne and buy back batteries at $150 per kilowatt-hour?” The math is brutal. The Democratic Republic of Congo produces roughly 70% of the world’s cobalt, essential for lithium-ion batteries. Yet virtually none of it gets processed locally. It leaves as ore, returns as finished goods, and the value captured in between flows elsewhere.
This absurdity is finally drawing scrutiny. As the world races to decarbonise transport and energy storage, East Africa finds itself mineral-rich but battery-poor. Now, governments and investors are betting that localising battery production across the East African Community could cut both emissions and import bills while capturing more value from the region’s resource wealth.
The question is whether the economics can align before the global battery market moves on.
The minerals are here. The value is not.
The EAC sits atop some of the world’s most coveted energy transition minerals. The DRC holds approximately 48% of global cobalt reserves and significant lithium deposits, according to the US Geological Survey. Tanzania has emerging graphite resources. Yet the region captures less than 5% of the battery value chain.
Congolese cobalt leaves as ore, gets refined in China or Belgium, becomes cathode material in South Korea, gets assembled into cells in China again, then returns to Nairobi as a 45,000 shilling ($350) battery pack for a solar home system. By one African Development Bank estimate, localising just cathode material production and cell assembly could generate $8.5 billion in annual value by 2035.
The gap exists for predictable reasons: lack of processing capacity, limited access to patient capital, weak intra-regional trade infrastructure, and a global industry already consolidated around Asian supply chains. Breaking in requires more than goodwill. It requires de-risking investment at scale.
The case for localisation
Two forces are making the case for EAC battery production newly compelling.
First, logistics costs are quietly punishing. Shipping battery cells from Shenzhen to Mombasa, then trucking them inland, adds 15 to 20% to landed costs before tariffs. For electric vehicle manufacturers or grid storage developers operating on thin margins, that matters. Producing closer to end markets could shave costs, particularly for bulky products like bus or grid batteries.
Second, emissions. A 2023 lifecycle analysis by Transport & Environment found that batteries assembled closer to mining sources using renewable energy could cut embodied emissions by up to 30% compared to conventional Asian supply chains. That distinction matters when buyers increasingly demand verifiable green credentials.
But the real prize is employment. Battery manufacturing is labour-light compared to textile production, but upstream processing creates skilled jobs. “Refining and cathode production are where the multiplier effects happen,” says James Mwangi, an industrial policy researcher at Nairobi’s Strathmore University. “Assembly is final, but processing is transformational.”
The pioneers and their hurdles
Several ventures are testing the model with varying degrees of ambition, though none have reached commercial battery production yet.
Rwanda and Tanzania are exploring graphite processing for battery anodes. In 2024, Tanzania announced plans for a $600 million lithium processing plant in Dodoma, backed by Chinese and Emirati investors. If realised, it would be the first facility in East Africa converting spodumene ore into battery-grade lithium carbonate.
The catch: permitting has dragged, and commodity price volatility has spooked backers. Lithium prices collapsed roughly 80% between late 2022 and mid-2024, according to Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, hammering project economics.
Kenya, despite having no operational battery production, has positioned itself as a potential assembly hub. The government’s Climate Action Plan 2023 to 2027 identifies battery manufacturing as a priority sector. Several feasibility studies are underway for lithium iron phosphate cell assembly targeting regional e-mobility and solar storage markets. But moving from PowerPoint to production requires capital that has yet to materialise.
Then there is the DRC, the elephant in every battery boardroom. The country’s cobalt is indispensable, but artisanal mining conditions remain grim. Child labour and unsafe practices persist despite corporate pledges. International buyers increasingly demand clean cobalt, creating an opening for Congolese processors who can certify ethical sourcing.
“We have the ore. We need the refineries,” Antoinette N’Samba Kalambayi, DRC’s former mines minister, told Bloomberg in 2023. “But investors see risk where we see resources.” Political instability and infrastructure deficits keep investment uncertain.
What it takes
Localising supply chains requires three interlocking ingredients.
Capital with patience. Battery plants require $200 million to $500 million in upfront investment, with payback periods stretching beyond ten years. That is too long for most commercial banks and too capital-intensive for development finance alone. Blended finance, where concessional funding de-risks private capital, is emerging as the model. The African Development Bank’s $25 billion Climate Action Window is one vehicle. The European Union’s Global Gateway has earmarked funds for African green supply chains. But deals close slowly, and currency risk remains a deterrent.
Intra-EAC coordination. Right now, EAC members compete more than they collaborate. Kenya wants final assembly. Tanzania wants refining. Rwanda wants both. Without a shared industrial strategy, the region risks fragmenting what should be an integrated value chain. The EAC Secretariat has floated the idea of a Regional Battery Corridor with harmonised tax incentives, streamlined customs, and shared research facilities. It is bold bureaucratic architecture that could work if political egos allow.
Quality and safety standards. Batteries are fussy products. Poor manufacturing leads to fires, performance degradation, and warranty nightmares. East African producers must meet international standards to access export markets and win contracts with serious buyers. That means investing in testing labs, training technicians, and earning certifications. Unglamorous but essential infrastructure that governments often overlook.
The geopolitics: A window, not a wall
Timing matters. The global battery supply chain is in flux. Western governments, wary of Chinese dominance, are offering subsidies and trade preferences for friendshored production. The US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act both incentivise sourcing from non-Chinese partners.
East Africa, with its mineral endowments and growing ties to both Western and Gulf investors, could position itself as a geopolitical hedge. But the window will not stay open forever. Indonesia has already moved aggressively to ban nickel ore exports and attract downstream investment, becoming the world’s largest stainless steel producer in under a decade.
“The countries that move first will set the terms,” says Judith Kendi, a trade policy analyst at the East African Trade Union Congress. “The ones that wait will take what is left.”
The road ahead: Pragmatism over perfection
Nobody expects Nairobi to become Shenzhen. But the goal is not replication. It is relevance. Capturing even 10% of the regional battery market would represent a meaningful shift, reducing import dependence and creating a platform for further industrial deepening.
The immediate opportunity lies in niches: lithium iron phosphate batteries for off-grid solar, electric two-wheelers, and stationary storage. Markets where Chinese mass production has not yet commoditised everything, and where proximity to customers matters. As these sectors mature, upstream processing can follow.
What is required is simple. It is the grinding work of aligning incentives, writing contracts, training workers, and building the unglamorous infrastructure that makes manufacturing work. Testing labs, trade corridors, skills centres.
Because if the region is serious about moving from exporting ore to exporting value, the pivot begins not in boardrooms, but in the processing plants and assembly lines that do not yet exist. The minerals are waiting. The question is whether the region can build the value chain to match.
By Our Staff Writer
