The pitch sounds compelling: Europe needs affordable renewable energy to meet climate targets; Africa possesses untapped renewable potential. Partner up, decarbonise together, create jobs. Everyone wins.
Except history suggests otherwise.
A new report from the Africa-Europe Foundation warns that without deliberate safeguards, Africa risks becoming what it calls a “green fuel station” for Europe, exporting clean energy whilst its own populations remain in darkness. The concern reflects patterns already emerging across the continent as European industries, facing expensive domestic decarbonisation, turn to African countries where production costs are lower.
The economics driving European interest
Europe’s climate obligations are colliding with economic reality. Producing green hydrogen domestically costs European industries between €3 and €7 per kilogramme, depending on renewable energy prices and electrolyser efficiency. Meanwhile, according to industry analyses, imported hydrogen is forecast to cost $3.75 per kilogramme in 2024, cheaper than domestic production in the short term.
For European industries facing expensive decarbonisation (steel production, fertiliser manufacturing, shipping fuels), outsourcing green energy production becomes commercially rational. Africa holds the solution. The continent possesses 60% of the world’s best solar resources, yet only 1% of installed solar photovoltaic capacity, according to the International Energy Agency. With further cost declines, the IEA estimates Africa could potentially produce 5,000 megatonnes of hydrogen annually at less than $2 per kilogramme, equivalent to current global total energy supply.
This is precisely the opportunity Europe is pursuing. And it is why the Africa-Europe Foundation’s latest report deserves attention.
The extractive pattern already emerging
Consider Namibia. In 2022, the country and the European Union formalised collaboration through a memorandum of understanding, serving Namibia’s goal of leading in the green hydrogen market and the EU’s drive to diversify energy sources. The EU has promised to mobilise €1 billion of public and private investment for renewable hydrogen and raw materials infrastructure in Namibia, according to the partnership agreement. Germany has committed €40 million, whilst Dutch state-backed firms are creating a €1 billion sovereign wealth fund for renewable hydrogen development.
The flagship Hyphen project targets production of 350,000 tonnes of green hydrogen annually, to be converted into green ammonia onsite. At full scale, the HyIron facility will produce one million tonnes of green iron annually whilst cutting 1.8 million tonnes of COâ‚‚ emissions.
This appears transformative. But here is the contradiction: in 2023, 600 million sub-Saharan Africans still lacked access to electricity, a number higher than in 2019, according to the International Energy Agency. The IEA projects that 645 million people will remain without access globally by 2030, with 85% in sub-Saharan Africa.
Namibia is building infrastructure to export green hydrogen to Europe whilst significant portions of its own region sit in darkness. The project follows an extractive logic: European markets set demand; African resources supply it; infrastructure connects production to European ports, not African populations.
The power asymmetry no one discusses
The report recommends African governments “link green projects to local needs” and “push for fair deals”. This advice misunderstands the structural problem.
Negotiating power does not stem from possessing resources. It derives from controlling capital, technology, and markets. Chinese electrolyser costs run approximately $600 per kilowatt whilst European manufacturing costs hit roughly $2,500 per kilowatt, according to industry data. European firms hold technological advantages; China dominates manufacturing; African countries provide land and sunshine.
This matters because green hydrogen projects require enormous upfront capital. To meet Europe’s 2030 targets, a 250-fold increase in electrolyser capacity is required, necessitating investment of €170–240 billion, according to European Commission estimates. African governments lack these resources. External financing determines project terms, ownership structures, and export destinations.
The Namibia-EU partnership illustrates this tension. Research examining the partnership notes that whilst it promises significant economic growth and job creation for Namibia, it faces criticism over transparency, implementation ambiguity, and potential green neocolonialism. The term “neocolonialism” appears because the pattern is recognisable: external actors finance infrastructure that extracts resources for external consumption, promising local benefits that remain perpetually deferred.
What “fair partnerships” actually require
The report’s recommendations (technology transfer, training programmes, local value addition) are necessary but insufficient. They ignore the question of who decides.
Consider technology transfer. European firms investing billions in Namibian hydrogen plants hold proprietary electrolyser technology, supply chain relationships, and market access. Contractual requirements for technology transfer are meaningless without enforcement mechanisms, technical capacity to absorb transferred knowledge, and markets where that knowledge creates value.
Training programmes face similar constraints. According to the Namibia University of Science and Technology, the EU partnership is re-skilling 700 graduates and preparing 40 new instructors for the hydrogen sector, with industry demand expected to reach between 55,000 and 130,000 skilled workers by 2040. This addresses labour supply. It doesn’t address who owns the projects those workers staff, where the energy goes, or how revenues are distributed.
Local value addition is the most challenging recommendation. The report suggests African countries should process raw materials domestically before export. Economically rational advice, except European industries need specific inputs at specific qualities delivered to specific locations. Green ammonia produced in Namibia for Dutch fertiliser plants serves Dutch agricultural needs, not African food security. Insisting ammonia remain in Namibia for local fertiliser production risks losing the investment entirely.
The climate finance sleight of hand
Beneath these partnerships lies uncomfortable mathematics. Africa needs $25 billion annually through 2030 to achieve universal electricity access, according to World Bank estimates. European green hydrogen investments in Africa amount to billions, but they’re directed towards export infrastructure, not domestic electrification.
The report argues that industrial demand for clean energy could expand electricity access. Of the 100 million tonnes of hydrogen produced in 2021, the IEA notes that 43% was used in oil refining and 57% in industry, principally in manufacturing ammonia for fertilisers. Green ammonia production requires enormous energy inputs.
Here’s the problem: ammonia produced for European fertiliser markets doesn’t power African villages. The energy goes into industrial processes serving European agriculture, not African electrification. These are parallel infrastructure systems. One connects production facilities to European ports; the other would connect generation capacity to African homes, schools, and hospitals.
Nothing about export-oriented hydrogen production makes domestic electrification more viable. Export projects secure financing because European demand provides guaranteed offtake agreements. Domestic electrification requires distribution infrastructure, subsidised tariffs for poor households, and patient capital with longer payback periods. These are fundamentally different investment propositions.
What would genuine partnership look like?
Start with binding conditionality. Any green energy project receiving European financing should be contractually required to allocate a percentage of generation capacity to domestic needs. Morocco’s Noor Ouarzazate solar complex offers a model: it feeds the Moroccan grid before exporting surplus. Namibia’s projects should do likewise.
Second, ownership structures matter. Joint ventures where African governments or local firms hold meaningful equity stakes ensure that project returns flow locally. Namibia’s sovereign wealth fund involvement is a step, but the fund is created in partnership with Dutch state-backed firms, raising questions about who ultimately controls decision-making.
Third, infrastructure investment must serve dual purposes. Port development at Walvis Bay facilitates hydrogen exports, but it could simultaneously strengthen regional trade integration if designed with broader economic development goals. Rail infrastructure connecting production sites to ports could connect African markets to each other, not just African resources to European demand.
Most critically, African countries need regional coordination. The African Union’s commitment to bringing 300 gigawatts of renewables online by 2030 represents an opportunity for coordinated strategy. Individual countries negotiating separately with European partners weaken their collective position.
The uncomfortable truth
Green energy partnerships between Africa and Europe are not inherently exploitative, but they are structured within power dynamics that encourage extractive outcomes. European needs drive timing, scale, and destination. European capital determines project viability. African resources enable it all, whilst African populations remain, in many cases, literally powerless.
The report’s warning deserves attention precisely because the pattern is emerging in real time. Climate change requires unprecedented international cooperation. Africa’s renewable resources are essential to global decarbonisation. But sustainability cannot mean sustaining historical patterns where African resources solve European problems whilst African populations wait for development that never arrives.
The Africa-Europe Foundation report concludes that “Africa’s industrial future should not be dictated by external interests alone, but co-developed with partners where interests align”. That question won’t be answered by reports. It will be determined by contract terms, ownership structures, and financing conditions negotiated in boardrooms where bargaining power is everything and good intentions mean nothing.
By Staff Writer
